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Chapter 9. The coordinated governance of EU social security policy -will there ever be enough?
by Paul Copeland and Beryl ter Haar
INTRODUCTION
The legislative and policy activities of the European Union concerning social security -in a broad sense -are characterised by coordination. On the one hand the EU coordinates the social security systems of the Member States in the context of the free movement of workers.
By the use of regulations, the EU has adopted a set of rules to determine which social security system applies in order to prevent a moving worker either paying social security contributions twice or from falling between two systems and consequently being deprived of any form of social security. This type of coordination has no direct intention to harmonise or replace the social security systems and leaves it to the discretion of the Member States as to who is to be insured and under what conditions. However, although the EU does not intend to influence the content of the domestic social security rules of the Member States, these regulations do have some harmonising effects. This is in particular true for EU measures on equal treatment, in particular in relation to pay, eg, the Defrenne cases. Consequently, these private international law rules, their harmonising and the EU equal treatment rules and case-law, can be considered as 'hard coordination'.
On the other hand the EU coordinates the social security policies and legislation of its Member States in the broader context of social cohesion, more specifically in the fight against poverty and social exclusion, including employment, social inclusion, health care and pensions. The main regulatory driver for these social security topics is the EU's Open Method of Coordination (OMC). Rather than harmonising the policies and legislation of the Member States, the aim of the Open Method of Coordination is to coordinate policy efforts to achieve common goals, with the eventual indirect aim of converging national policies. To achieve this in the gradual erosion of the programmes and policies that constitute a European social dimension. Moreover, it distracts from efforts to create a genuine social dimension via hard law measures that would counterbalance market-led integration. Others consider the Open
Method of Coordination as an innovative breakthrough with superior capacity to solve some of the complex problems facing European society. 5 The purpose of this contribution is not to resolve this dispute, rather its aim is to unravel EU coordinative and supportive initiatives, ie EU initiatives that are addressed to the Member States with the intention to influence their domestic policies and legislation in the wider field of social security. Moreover, the aim is to assess the potential integration capacity of these activities based on their legal dynamics.
These legal dynamics include: formal aspects such as the competence of the EU to deal with these issues in general and the specific type of actions in particular, EU general concepts such as supremacy of EU law and direct effect, and the type of incentives created to enforce and stimulate compliance with EU initiatives.
To complete the analysis of EU activity in the wider field of social security these initiatives and their legal dynamics are reviewed in relation to each other. This part of the analysis builds on the theory of hybrid structures, which argues that similar to the national level, EU initiatives do not operate in a policy vacuum; indeed they interact with many different activities. Generally three forms of interaction can be distinguished: rival, complementary, and transformative. The type of interaction between the different initiatives influences their effectiveness as a governance tool. The analysis reveals that the EU is more active in the wider policy field of social security than is often presumed by legal scholars.
Since the main focus of this contribution is on the Open Method of Coordination as soft coordination, this analysis allows us to assess the particular role of the Open Method of Coordination in relation to other (soft) governance initiatives, such as recommendations, resolutions, and European funds, and its role in furthering EU social security. 4 Among many others C De la Porte and J Pochet (eds) The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section II provides a historical account of the development of EU activities in the wider policy field of social security. The section concludes with an inventory of the various initiatives that are generally applied by the EU in this field. Section III describes the analytical frameworks used to analyse the legal dynamics of these initiatives and their interactions. In Section IV the identified initiatives are analysed and the results are discussed in Section V. To conclude this contribution, the findings are critically assessed in the wider context of European integration, more particularly in the overarching policy context of Europe 2020 and the European Semester of which the soft coordination activities in the wider field of social security are part.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EU ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT POVERTY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION
Legal studies regarding the European integration of social security predominantly focus on hard coordination. For other EU activities in the field of social security it is necessary to look for specific policy topics. When reviewing the development of the European social dimension this is unsurprising, since it is characterised by a patchwork of policy activities. 6 Another distinctive feature of the social dimension is that the hard coordination of social security is one of the first actions in the process of European integration (Regulations 3 and 4 of 1958).
However, the first broadly supportive European action dates back to 1975, namely a specific programme to combat poverty. 7 Subsequent programmes to combat poverty have been adopted in following periods. The core governance mechanism in these programmes is to provide financial support for national policies that fall within the scope of the programme.
Member States are not obliged to participate in these programmes. Non-participating Member
States are not forced to comply by a judicial procedure or by shaming. However, these programmes are highly sensitive as illustrated by a case initiated by the UK, supported by Apparently aware of the sensitivity of poverty and social protection policies as an independent goal in themselves, the subject was framed in other policy fields. Hence, this resulted in two policy pathways to deal with these subjects. The first pathway concerns the poverty programmes that were framed in the field of human rights and EU citizenship, where relational issues of power, participation and integration into society were stressed. 13 The second pathway concerns social protection policies, which became part of a concerted strategy within European Monetary Union (EMU) and in addition to the European Employment Strategy (EES). 14 In particular the development of the postmodern activation paradigm enshrined in the European Employment Strategy explains why Member States could agree to 'create and participate in a process coordinated at the European level for the area of social inclusion'.
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Preceded by the European Employment Strategy, the Lisbon Strategy reframed the governance structure into a general one and dubbed it the Open Method of Coordination.
Since the modernisation of social protection systems was already on the EU political agenda in the 1990s, besides the Council Recommendation, the Commission adopted two The result is a complex governance regime with an integrated and coordinated governance structure, pooling together specific subjects in the field of social inclusion and social protection. Moreover, it coordinates and pools together several governance instruments, among which are the Open Method of Coordination, which governs Europe 2020 itself, the European Employment Strategy (in which the poverty and social exclusion guideline is integrated), and financial support via the European Social Fund, Resolutions, Decisions, etc. Table 9 .1 gives a more detailed overview of the policy fields involved and the integration instruments used to govern these policies. Figure 9 .1 provides a schematic of the policy regime on social inclusion and social protection. This regime also indicates how the policies are pooled together, which is an indication of how the related instruments can potentially interact. 
III. LEGAL INTEGRATION DYNAMICS OF THE ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE
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Based on these two underlying concepts the model is comprised of five parameters:
(1) competence conferred to the European Union for (further) rule-making; (2) the integration technique used; (3) the decision-making capacity of the EU institutions adopting the instrument; (4) the incidence or effect of the instrument on the national legal order; and (5) the means to foster compliance with the normative part of the instrument. Each parameter is subdivided into four levels of integration capacity. Level 4 indicates a weak integration capacity and level 1 indicates a strong integration capacity. Integration capacity in this model refers to the extent to which the instrument under analysis is likely to integrate, converge or influence the laws and policies of the Member States. This means that when most of the parameters in an instrument are analysed as level 3 or 3, the extent to which the instrument is likely to integrate, converge or influence domestic laws and policies is weak. Conversely, when most of the parameters in an instrument are analysed as level 1 or 2, its integration capacity is considered to be strong. Figure 9 .2 summarises the analytical model. 
III.ii. Analysis of the Legal Dynamics of the Acquis Communautaire of Social Security
Section II described the historical development of EU integration in the field of social security and gave focus to social inclusion and social protection. The historical account reveals that with the exception of the coordinating regulations, most of the other instruments that embody the acquis communautaire of social security are soft law instruments. Since they have been pooled together by the Social Investment Package, the analysis of the legal dynamics of this field is limited to these instruments (see Table 9 .1). This may not capture all of the instruments that are part of the acquis, yet since it is the core of the acquis the analysis of these instruments will be sufficiently representative of the whole acquis. The analysis is structured by type of instruments, thus the Open Method of Coordination, resolution, action programme, etc and by specific policy field. The first distinction is convenient, since instruments of the same type share similar qualifications on certain parameters, in particular integration technique, effects on the national legal order and ensuring compliance. The second distinction is needed since the policy field is influential in the qualification of the first and third parameters -conferred competence and decision-making capacity.
Since the interest of this analysis lies with the integration capacity of the EU instruments to integrate, converge or influence the laws and policies of the Member States, the analysis is limited to instruments that address Member States. This excludes, for instance, the Europe 2020 Strategy and the Social Investment Package, and also the Social Agenda and European 'Year'. The first two are excluded since they address governance activities of the EU institutions by the establishment of a coordinative framework in which those activities are pooled together. As such, they merely address the Member States indirectly, namely via the activities they yoke together in their governance structure. This is influential on the integration capacity of those instruments, however this cannot be assessed by this analytical model but will be analysed in the next section on the hybrid structures between the instruments analysed in this section. The other instruments, the Social Agenda and European 'Year', are political instruments to raise attention for the subjects on political levels and not legal instruments that aim to integrate, converge or influence Member States' laws and policies. Based on the inventory listed in 
Competence
The first parameter deals with the type of competence conferred to the EU to deal with a certain subject. While in the pre-Lisbon Treaty era it was difficult to determine the exact type of competence that was conferred to the EU, 42 this has become more straightforward since the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty. The TFEU has introduced a catalogue of competences in its first part -Articles 2-6 TFEU. Article 2 TFEU explains the different types of competences,
and Articles 3-6 TFEU define which subjects fall within the different types of competences.
To what extent a competence can be executed depends on the exact formulation of the legal basis provision also included in the TFEU. The competence to deal with youth policies is even more complex. In the 'competence catalogue' one reference is found to youth as a policy field, namely in Article 6(e) TFEU, which contributes a supporting and supplementing competence to the EU. However, when searching for legal basis provisions dealing with youth, two are found. The first is Article 47 TFEU, which is part of the free movement of people (part of the internal market). The competence of the EU concerning the internal market is that of shared competence, which is from a European point of view much stronger than supporting and supplementing, since it includes the option to adopt harmonising measures. 43 That the field of youth policy is not intended to result in harmonising actions of the EU can be deduced from the activity it describes: 'Member States shall, within the framework of a joint programme, encourage the exchange of young workers'. This is very similar to the other legal basis provision dealing with youth, Article 165(2) TFEU, which reads as a fifth field of action 'encouraging the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of socio-educational instructors, and encouraging the participation of young people in democratic life in Europe'. At best both provisions provide the legal basis to adopt supporting and supplementing provisions.
Integration technique
The integration technique of the European Employment Strategy is rather straightforward since it is the prototype of coordination of the policies of the Member States. is left is the coordination of measures supporting the Member States to achieve the common goals. It is not the policies or policy outcomes of the Member States that are coordinated, hence it is the EU supporting measures that are coordinated. In this respect the conclusion is that the integration technique of the youth Open Method of Coordination is supportive.
Decision-making capacity
This parameter strongly relates to the first, the competence of the EU. In essence, the institutions of the EU making the decisions cannot go beyond the competence conferred upon The funds all have in common that they indirectly influence the policies and legislation of the Member States. Because the financial support received from a fund needs to be applied in a policy field promoted by the EU, it stimulates the Member State to undertake activities in line with the EU policy field and encourages them to experiment with different policies to achieve a certain objective. If the policy is unsuccessful it will not be continued, when it is successful it will be incorporated into the ordinary policies and laws of the Member
States. Once the latter happens, the national policies and laws come closer to the EU objectives.
This indirect effect of the funds and the allocation of substantial amounts of money to certain policy objectives can result in Member States being wary about the establishment of the funding programmes. Moreover, the acceptance of a financial support programme in a particular policy field equals acknowledging EU competence in that field. This gives the impression that the capacity of the funds to ensure compliance is very strong (judicial review), however, the aim of this analysis is to assess the legal capacity of the funds to integrate the policies and laws of the Member States. In this respect funds are not that strong. In general the rules on the funds 54 can be read as the policy activities being subject to 148(2) TFEU. 56 As such these guiding principles could be considered as tertiary EU law providing further interpretation of EU secondary law, i.e. employment guideline 7 of the European Employment Strategy. The policy subjects they can connect to are all fields in which the EU has coordinative competence.
The regulatory technique falls between procedural obligations (the collecting of information, exchange of practices) and that of coordination (setting of common objectives and policy guidelines). They are clearly distinctive from the coordination as provided by the Open Method of Coordination, since they lack the governance structure. For instance, the performance of Member States is not measured by indicators or monitored by country reports that are reviewed by the Commission and Council. These initiatives are not adopted by EU legislators (the European Parliament and/or Council), instead they are adopted by the Commission (e.g. voluntary EU quality framework) and the European Council (declaration on guiding principles on active ageing). The aim of these instruments is to stimulate the Member
States to prioritise these subjects in their national policies. As such it can be concluded that the Commission and the European Council function in their capacity as moving spirits.
These instruments have an indirect effect on the policies and legislation of the Member
States. At best they have the effect that the issues are prioritised by the Member States, however the extent to which the Member States undertake the actions proposed by these instruments is at their discretion. These instruments themselves hold no monitoring or compliance mechanisms. Instead they try to persuade the Member States to comply by offering support, by gathering information, by technical assistance and by financial support via one or several funds. The latter can be very persuasive, since money itself is a strong incentive and, as analysed in the previous section, the use of EU funding can have a significant impact on the policy objectives supported by it.
III.iii. The Legal Integration Capacity of the Acquis Communautaire for Social Security
The overall impression from the above analysis of the legal integration capacity of the instruments of the acquis communautaire in the area of social security is that it is relatively weak, since most of the parameters manifest themselves in the upper part of the analytical model. There are two things that stand out in the above analysis though. The integration technique they all use is that of coordination and the effect on the national legal order of the instruments is indirect. This applies to all instruments, including the hard coordination 56 Council Decision of 21 October 2010 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States [2010] OJ L308/46, guideline 7.
regulation, with the exception of the equal treatment instruments, which are based on the integration technique of 'minimum harmonisation' and have a direct effect on the national legal orders.
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This acquis appears to be imbued with an awareness of common problems in the wider field of social security, with the EU considered to be the most appropriate level to address these problems, in particular by setting the common objectives and policy guidelines to achieve those objectives. In fact, what the EU appears to have created with the Social Investment Package is a laboratory for policy experimentation to find out what will work best to face the common problems Member States encounter in the wider field of social security.
Member States are persuaded to participate by the funds that are made available in this field. 
IV. HYBRID STRUCTURES WITHIN THE SOCIAL INVESTMENT PACKAGE AND BETWEEN THE SOCIAL INVESTMENT PACKAGE AND THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF EUROPE 2020
In this section we will analyse the interaction of the instruments that are used to govern the seven policy fields of the Social Investment Package. Such analysis is interesting since the type of interaction is influential on the integration capacity of the acquis as a whole. For this analysis we build on the theory of hybrid structures, which acknowledges the coexistence of different integration instruments in one policy field. Moreover, it argues that the manner in which those coexisting instruments interact is influential on the integration capacity of the acquis of the policy field. Instruments that, for instance, strive for dominance over each other rivalry. On the other hand instruments that merge their techniques for the same cause, for example to break the cycle of poverty in order to improve the situation of children, are likely to strengthen each other's integration capacities. Without this merger it will be much harder, if not impossible, to achieve the goal. This interaction is indicated as transformative. If instruments are neither rivalry nor transformative they are complementary to each other.
When this is unconscious it is unlikely to have any impact on the integration capacity; they are simply not conflicting with each other. When this is consciously designed they are likely to have a positive impact on each other's strengths, however they are still operating independently from each other. Their interaction is not an essential requirement to achieve the goal, but it is also not meaningless.
That the policy fields within the Social Investment Package are related and overlap has already been analysed in Section II and has been worked out in Figure 9 .1. In this section we focus on the relationship between the instruments that are used to govern those policy fields.
After all it is these instruments that are designed to influence the policies and legislation of Apparently, other instruments are able to connect with different instruments such as the Open Method of Coordination, whereas this is harder the other way around. This could partly be explained by the fact that the Open Method of Coordination itself is a type of strategy setting out a full policy programme including common objectives and policy guidelines. As such it functions as a magnet attracting more elaborated policies tapping in on parts of its objectives and policy guidelines.
The funds appear to strengthen the interaction between the Open Method of Coordination and the voluntary guiding instruments by supporting the same policy activities.
Although this appears not to be the result of a conscious design, it is a form of complementarity, which plays to the strengths of these instruments. Via the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of the funds, both instruments can benefit from the lessons learned Having an oversight of the subjects and EU initiatives to promote these subjects, we were able to identify the instruments that are mostly used to govern the area. These include several forms of the Open Method of Coordination, EU funds, recommendations and declarations defining problems, and establishing policy guidelines to deal with those issues.
Our analysis of the potential legal integration dynamics confirmed the weak legal status of these instruments. This indicates that although there is considerable activity in the field, none of it is likely to have the effect of harmonising the Member States' policies in the area of social security issues. However, when considering the initiatives in hybridity to each other, this conclusion may have to be reconsidered. The manner in which the different policy fields and governance initiatives are related to each other is rather coherent and consistent, making the subjects more tangible. Furthermore, by using the Open Method of Coordination as the main form of governance of the Social Investment Package as well as its wider context in Europe 2020, other initiatives, in particular the funds and initiatives that set guidelines, are coordinated.
Thus soft coordination by means of the Open Method of Coordination can be considered as a positive contribution since it is able to create coherence and consistency on two levels -by subjects and by governance. However, when this is reviewed in the wider context of Europe 2020 as we have done in the third and fourth sections, this appears less promising than it looks. In the broader context of Europe 2020 the EU's economic and fiscal governance in the SGP and by the 'Six-Pack', is dominant. Between the economic objectives and the social objectives there is an almost inherent conflict of interest. Whereas the economic objectives are strongly focused on the budget deficits of the Member States, they affect the social objectives since they comprise a substantial part of the budget. When budgets need to be cut to meet the deficit standards, this affects the social expenditures that are part of, for instance, the Social Investment Package. Consequently, the governance of soft coordination in
